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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
In this trademark infringement case, we are required to 
consider whether the District Court erred when it awarded 
the plaintiffs a percentage of the profits of the defendant 
corporation and then trebled that award and also assessed 
attorneys' fees. Central to these awards was the District 
Court's finding that the defendant corporation had willfully 
infringed the plaintiff's trademark. Because we conclude 
that the evidence does not support a finding of willful 
infringement, we reverse and remand for further 
proceedings. 
 
I. 
 
In 1980, Ronald Libengood lost his job in the 
Westinghouse corporate security department, and he then 
began a small company that he called SecuraComm 
Associates. SecuraComm Associates was a security systems 
consulting firm that consulted with clients, surveyed 
facilities, designed security systems, managed projects, 
reviewed bids and evaluations, developed training 
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programs, and presented security-related workshops. The 
firm deliberately refrained from arranging for the purchase 
and installation of equipment and from providing 
maintenance and technical support. The firm took this 
approach because many clients insisted on the separation 
of consulting from installation and support services so that 
the advice given would not be affected by conflicts of 
interest. Initially, most of SecuraComm Pennsylvania's 
business consisted of work for Westinghouse in Western 
Pennsylvania, but Libengood subsequently developed other 
clients in other areas. 
 
Libengood formed the SecuraComm name from the terms 
"security" and "communications." When he coined this 
name, he was unaware of any other use of the word. All 
brochures, letters, and correspondence of his company bore 
the name SecuraComm Associates. 
 
After losing Westinghouse as a client in 1992, Libengood 
incorporated his firm as SecuraComm Consulting, Inc. 
hereinafter ("SecuraComm Pennsylvania") and continued to 
do business through the corporation. Libengood was and is 
the president and major shareholder of SecuraComm 
Pennsylvania. After incorporation, the business expanded, 
but SecuraComm Pennsylvania remained a small company, 
with average annual revenues between 1992 and 1996 of 
slightly more than $250,000 per year. Since its inception, 
SecuraComm Pennsylvania has used the SecuraComm 
mark with Libengood's permission, and on January 1, 
1995, Libengood and SecuraComm Pennsylvania entered 
into a formal licensing agreement. 
 
In May 1993, Libengood applied for registration of the 
word "Securacomm" without reference to capitalization or 
stylization. Although the application was abandoned for a 
time, Libengood reinstated the application and received a 
registration on May 20, 1997. The registration application 
indicated a first use on January 1, 1980, and afirst use in 
interstate commerce on September 3, 1981. 
 
The predecessor of the defendant corporation, now called 
Securacom Incorporated, was formed by Sebastian 
Cassetta, and in 1987 this company became affiliated with 
the large engineering firm of Burns & Roe. The company's 
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name was then changed to "Burns & Roe Securacom." In 
that same year, Libengood became aware of Burns & Roe 
Securacom as the result of a chance event at a conference 
in Washington, D.C., Libengood saw Cassetta throw into a 
fish bowl a business card bearing the name "Burns & Roe 
Securacom." Libengood then spoke with Cassetta during 
lunch, and Cassetta told him that he knew about 
Libengood's firm but that his attorneys had informed him 
that the similarity in the companies' names would not 
cause problems. Cassetta said that the use of "Securacom" 
preceded by the well known name "Burns & Roe" was not 
likely to cause confusion. He also noted that the two 
companies served different clienteles, since Burns & Roe 
Securacom engaged in upgrading security at overseas 
embassies and performed work in the nuclear field. 
Libengood took no action in response to this encounter. 
 
In 1992, Burns & Roe Securacom hired Ronald Thomas 
as its chief executive officer, and within two days of 
Thomas's employment, Cassetta was fired. After Cassetta 
left, the company he had founded became independent of 
Burns & Roe when it received a substantial investment 
from entities including KuwAm Corporation, a venture 
capital firm of which defendant Wirt D. Walker, III, is a 
shareholder and officer. The new, independent company 
expanded its activities into the full range of security 
services. 
 
In October 1992, a certificate of amendment wasfiled in 
the Delaware Secretary of State's Office, indicating that 
Burns & Roe Securacom had changed its name to 
Securacom Incorporated (hereinafter "Securacom New 
Jersey"). In November 1992, Securacom New Jerseyfiled a 
trademark application with the Patent and Trademark 
Office for the term "Securacom, Incorporated" for goods 
and/or services consisting of "large-scale security and 
facility management for businesses and government." This 
application alleged that the first use was in November 
1992. Securacom New Jersey was denied federal 
registration because two other companies -- neither of 
which was SecuraComm Pennsylvania -- had filed 
applications to register names similar to "Securacom." 
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In January 1993, Libengood learned about Securacom 
New Jersey's name change, as well as its expanded 
business base. After consulting with an attorney, Libengood 
mailed Securacom New Jersey a cease and desist letter. 
Libengood and Thomas attempted to settle the controversy. 
Libengood proposed that Securacom New Jersey either (1) 
change its name and compensate SecuraComm 
Pennsylvania for the use of its mark, (2) purchase the 
Securacom mark from SecuraComm Pennsylvania, or (3) 
license the name from SecuraComm Pennsylvania. These 
negotiations continued for approximately one and one-half 
years until Libengood set a deadline of the end of 1994. 
 
In November 1994, Libengood asked Thomas to share in 
the cost for appraising the Securacom mark. Thomas did 
not respond, and Libengood then went forward on his own. 
The appraiser estimated that the value of SecuraComm 
Pennsylvania's mark, together with the cost of changing its 
name, was $275,000. Libengood provided this appraisal to 
Thomas in May 1995. 
 
In June 1995, Libengood informed Thomas that, since he 
had received no response from Securacom New Jersey, he 
would institute legal proceedings after 30 days. After some 
time, Thomas informed Libengood that he would have to 
deal with Walker, then the chairman of the board of 
Securacom New Jersey. When Libengood spoke with 
Walker, Walker became abusive and told Libengood that if 
he filed suit Walker would bury him financially and take 
everything he had. 
 
Libengood filed suit against Securacom New Jersey in 
October 1995, alleging (1) service mark infringement, in 
violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1125; (2) false 
designation of origin, false description, and unfair 
competition, in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 
S 1125; (3) common law infringement and unfair 
competition; and (4) appropriation of name, good will, and 
reputation, in violation of N.J.S.A. S 56:4-1, 2. In November 
1995, Securacom New Jersey filed an answer and a third- 
party complaint against Libengood, and in December 1995, 
Libengood filed a third-party answer, defenses, and third- 
party counterclaims. These counterclaims included the 
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same four causes of action that SecuraComm Pennsylvania 
had asserted, plus a fifth count for libel. 
 
At the same time, Securacom New Jersey's directors 
signed a document stating that Libengood's suit was 
meritless. The document specifically stated that Libengood 
was attempting to extort a payment of $275,000 from 
Securacom New Jersey. In November 1995, Walker signed 
a letter directing Securacom New Jersey's attorneys (1) to 
seek summary judgment and Rule 11 sanctions against 
Libengood and his attorneys; (2) to file suit against 
Libengood and his attorneys for extortion and RICO 
violations; and (3) to file complaints with various bar 
associations against Libengood's attorneys for unethical 
behavior in filing suit against Securacom New Jersey. 
Walker sent a copy of this letter to Libengood and his 
attorneys. 
 
Securacom New Jersey's attorneys filed suit against 
Libengood and his attorney in New Jersey Superior Court in 
April 1996. This suit was removed to federal court and 
consolidated with Libengood's trademark infringement case, 
and the District Court dismissed the suit as frivolous. 
Securacom New Jersey also filed a service mark 
infringement suit against SecuraComm Pennsylvania in the 
District of Columbia Superior Court, but the District Court 
in New Jersey enjoined that action. Finally, the District 
Court stayed Securacom New Jersey's petition to cancel 
Libengood's trademark. 
 
In May 1996, SecuraComm Pennsylvania and Libengood 
amended their complaints to add KuwAm Corporation and 
Walker as defendants. In July 1996, SecuraComm 
Pennsylvania added a libel count to its complaint. In 
August 1996, the new defendants filed an amended answer, 
counterclaims, and a third-party complaint. In addition to 
alleging various Lanham Act violations against 
SecuraComm Pennsylvania, the third-party complaint 
requested cancellation of Libengood's trademark 
registration if such registration occurred. 
 
In October 1997, this case was tried before the District 
Court. At the close of trial, the Court enjoined Securacom 
New Jersey's use of the word "Securacom." The Court found 
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that confusion was likely because of the slight difference 
between the companies' businesses, 984 F. Supp. at 298- 
301, and the Court noted that this confusion was 
particularly problematic because it was crucial to 
SecuraComm Pennsylvania's business that it refrain from 
providing the integrated services that Securacom New 
Jersey furnished to its clients. Id. at 295-96. The Court also 
found that actual confusion had occurred on occasion and 
that the confusion had prejudiced SecuraComm 
Pennsylvania. Id. at 296. In addition, the Court extensively 
quoted Walker's unfavorable opinions about the civil justice 
system. Id. at 291, 293, 293-94, 295. 
 
The District Court declined to enter an amount of 
compensatory damages because, while it was likely, 
according to the District Court, that SecuraComm 
Pennsylvania had suffered damages, the damages "[could] 
[ ]not be measured with reasonable precision." Id. at 303. 
Then, after finding that an award of Securacom New 
Jersey's profits was necessary to "deter[ ] . . . the kind of 
conduct in which all three defendants . . . engaged," the 
District Court awarded the plaintiffs 10% of Securacom 
New Jersey's gross profits. 984 F. Supp. at 303. The Court 
trebled this amount based on the "egregious 
circumstances" of the case. Id. Finally, the Court awarded 
attorneys' fees on the ground that Securacom New Jersey's 
conduct showed bad faith, fraud, malice, and knowing 
infringement. Id. The defendants appealed. 
 
II. 
 
In this appeal, Securacom New Jersey does not either 
challenge the District Court's finding of infringement or the 
order of injunctive relief. However, Securacom New Jersey 
strongly contests the District Court's finding that the 
infringement was willful. In addition, Securacom New 
Jersey challenges (a) the District Court's award of profits, 
which was based in large part on the finding of willful 
infringement, (b) the trebling of the award of profits, and (c) 
the award of attorney's fees. Securacom New Jersey also 
argues that Libengood did not have national trademark 
rights and that, therefore, the figures the District Court 
used to calculate profits were too large. We agree with 
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Securacom New Jersey that the record does not support a 
finding of willful infringement, and we therefore reverse the 
award of profits, the trebling of the award of profits, and 
the order awarding attorneys' fees. We remand the issue of 
the attorneys' fees to the District Court for further 
consideration. 
 
Section 35 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1117 provides: 
 
       When a violation of any right of the registrant of a 
       mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or 
       a violation under section 43(a), shall have been 
       established in any civil action arising under this Act, 
       the plaintiff shall be entitled, subject to the provisions 
       of sections 29 and 32 and subject to the principles of 
       equity, to recover (1) defendant's profits, (2) any 
       damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of 
       the action. The court shall assess such profits or cause 
       the same to be assessed under its direction. In 
       assessing profits the plaintiff shall be required to prove 
       defendant's sales only; defendant must prove all 
       elements of cost of reduction claimed. In assessing 
       damages the court may enter judgment, according to 
       the circumstances of the case, for any sum above the 
       amount found as actual damages, not exceeding three 
       times such amount. If the court shall find that the 
       amount of recovery based on profits is either 
       inadequate or excessive the court may in its discretion 
       enter judgment for such sum as the court shall find to 
       be just, according to the circumstances of the case. 
       Such sum in either of the above circumstances shall 
       constitute compensation and not a penalty. The court 
       in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney 
       fees to the prevailing party. 
 
Though the standards for (1) awarding profits; (2) 
determining whether such an award should be enhanced; 
and (3) awarding attorneys' fees under the Lanham Act 
differ somewhat, the issue of willful infringement is central 
to each. See ALPO Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 
F.2d 958, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("an award based on 
defendant's profits requires proof that the defendant acted 
willfully or in bad faith"); 5 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy 
on Trademarks and Unfair Competition S 30.91 at 30-148 
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n.6 (4th Ed. 1996) (willful infringement provides usual 
basis for enhancing profits award) (collecting cases); Ferrero 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Ozak Trading, Inc., 952 F.2d 44, 47 (3d Cir. 
1991) (showing of bad faith, fraud, malice or willfulness 
necessary for award of attorneys' fees).1  Therefore, we will 
first address the District Court's finding that Securacom 
New Jersey willfully infringed SecuraComm Pennsylvania's 
mark. 
 
A. Willful Infringement 
 
Knowing or willful infringement consists of more than the 
accidental encroachment of another's rights. It involves an 
intent to infringe or a deliberate disregard of a mark 
holder's rights. The Second Circuit has aptly described 
willful infringement as involving "an aura of indifference to 
plaintiff's rights" or a "deliberate[ ] and unnecessar[y] 
duplicating [of a] plaintiff's mark . . . in a way that was 
calculated to appropriate or otherwise benefit from the good 
will the plaintiff had nurtured." W.E. Bassett Co. v. Revlon, 
Inc., 435 F.2d 656, 662 (2d Cir. 1970) (citation omitted); see 
also Rolex Watch USA, Inc. v. Meece, 158 F.3d 816, 823 
(5th Cir. 1998) ("willful infringement carries a connotation 
of deliberate intent to deceive.") (quoting Lindy Pen Co. v. 
Bic Pen Corp., 982 F.2d 1400, 1405 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
510 U.S. 815 (1993)). We agree with Securacom New Jersey 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Willful infringement has a central role in the availability of each of 
these kinds of relief because of the relevance of equitable factors in 
determining their appropriateness on a given set of facts. See 15 U.S.C. 
S 1117 (1994) (collection of defendant's profits and award of enhanced 
damages "subject to principles of equity"); Champion Spark Plug Co. v. 
Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 131 (1947) (denying accounting of defendant's 
profits based on "equities of the case"); BASF Corp. v. Old World Trading 
Co., Inc., 41 F.3d 1081, 1096 (7th Cir. 1993) (discussing availability of 
enhanced damages under heading "equitable remedies"); Rolex Watch 
USA, Inc. v. Meece, 158 F.3d 818, 826 (5th Cir. 1998) (award of 
enhanced damages limited by "equitable considerations"); Levi Strauss & 
Co. v. Shilon, 121 F.3d 1309, 1314 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing to 15 U.S.C. 
S 1117(b) (court may award attorney fees in"exceptional cases") and 
noting that "equitable considerations" limit award of attorney fees). 
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that the record in this case cannot support a finding of 
willful infringement.2 
 
First, we are constrained to conclude that the District 
Court committed clear error when it found that "Walker 
and the company he dominated . . . knowingly infringed 
[SecuraComm Pennsylvania's] mark . . .[f]or years before 
this action was commenced." 984 F. Supp. at 303-04. 
There is no direct evidence in the record that Securacom 
New Jersey knew about Libengood and his small firm 
before Libengood's cease and desist letter was sent in 1993. 
Thomas testified that he first learned about Libengood and 
his company at that time, and no direct evidence to the 
contrary has been called to our attention. Moreover, there 
is no circumstantial evidence from which it may reasonably 
be inferred that Securacom New Jersey learned about 
SecuraComm Pennsylvania prior to the cease and desist 
letter. It is true that Cassetta knew about Libengood and 
his company in 1987, but it is unreasonable under the 
circumstances to infer that Cassetta passed on this 
information to Securacom New Jersey's new management 
either directly or indirectly. 
 
It is apparent that in 1987 neither Cassetta nor 
Libengood attached much significance to the similarities in 
the companies' names. Cassetta expressed the opinion that 
this similarity would not cause problems because his 
company's name included the name of the large firm 
"Burns & Roe" and because the companies worked in 
unrelated areas. It is telling that Libengood made no 
complaint about Cassetta's company for the next six years. 
Cassetta's attitude and Libengood's inaction strongly 
suggest that neither man thought that the matter was 
important. Thus, until at least 1992, Securacom New 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We review the District Court's finding of willful infringement for 
clear 
error. See ISCYRA v. Tommy Hilfiger, U.S.A., Inc., 80 F.3d 749, 752 (2d 
Cir. 1996); Ferrero U.S.A., Inc. v. Ozak Trading, Inc., 952 F.2d 44, 48 
(3d 
Cir. 1991). Under this standard, a finding is"clearly erroneous when the 
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed." Newark Branch, NAACP 
v. City of Bayonne, 134 F.3d 113, 120 (3d Cir. 1997). We do not review 
the evidence de novo, but we do consider whether there is enough 
evidence in the record to support the District Court's factual findings. 
Id. 
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Jersey reasonably believed the use of the Securacom mark 
did not infringe, and "[i]nfringement is not willful if the 
defendant might have reasonably thought that its proposed 
usage was not barred by the statute." Blockbuster Videos, 
Inc. v. City of Tempe, 141 F.3d 1295, 1300 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(internal quotation omitted). 
 
The similarity in the companies' names became 
potentially more significant in 1992. At that time, 
Libengood changed the name of his company from 
"SecuraComm Associates" to "SecuraComm Consulting 
Inc." and expanded its client base. There is no evidence, 
however, that Cassetta or anyone else at Securacom New 
Jersey took notice of these changes. Also in 1992,"Burns 
& Roe Securacomm" changed its name to "Securacom Inc.," 
and the company expanded its business into new fields, 
but these events occurred after Cassetta left. Cassetta was 
fired two days after Thomas took over, and there is nothing 
to suggest that during these final two days Cassetta told 
Thomas or anyone else who remained with the firm about 
Libengood and his company -- a matter that, as noted, had 
not previously been regarded as troublesome. Under these 
circumstances, we see no reasonable basis for inferring that 
Cassetta directly or indirectly informed Securacom New 
Jersey's management about Libengood and his company. 
 
Relying upon the general principle that the knowledge of 
a corporate officer is imputed to the corporation, the 
plaintiffs argue that Cassetta's knowledge of the existence 
of SecuraComm Pennsylvania should be imputed to 
Securacom New Jersey and that therefore Securacom New 
Jersey's use of its mark after the critical events of 1992 
cannot be regarded as having been done in good faith. We 
reject this argument because we find it inconsistent with 
the equitable principles that make the question of 
willfulness important. Whether Securacom New Jersey 
engaged in willful infringement is significant because 
courts, looking to "the principles of equity," 15 U.S.C. 
S 1117, have held that a finding of willfulness or bad faith 
is important in determining whether to award profits, 
enhance damages, and award attorney fees. See page 7, 
supra. Under the circumstances here, plaintiffs' argument 
regarding imputed knowledge is inconsistent with the 
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equitable basis of these doctrines. As we have noted, 
neither Cassetta nor Libengood seemed concerned about 
the similarity between the names of their two companies 
when Cassetta's company was called "Burns & Roe 
Securacom" and the companies served different clienteles. 
As of the date of Cassetta's termination, neither of these 
factors had changed. The plaintiffs would have us combine 
what Cassetta knew (but, as far as the record shows, never 
passed on to the new management that fired him) with 
what new management subsequently knew regarding the 
company's change in name and range of services. The 
plaintiffs cite no direct supporting authority for this 
argument, and we find it inequitable under the 
circumstances present here. 
 
Second, we conclude that Securacom New Jersey's failure 
to conduct a trademark search is not sufficient to support 
the finding of willful infringement. In Tommy Hilfiger, 
U.S.A., Inc., 80 F.3d 749 (2d Cir. 1996), the Second Circuit 
stated that an alleged infringer's failure to conduct a full 
trademark search after its attorneys advise that such a 
search is warranted may evidence willful ignorance akin to 
willful infringement. But the Second Circuit emphasized in 
that case that the infringer's attorneys had specifically 
advised it to conduct a full search and that the infringer 
was aware when it adopted the mark that it was copying 
"authentic details" from the plaintiff's design. Id. at 753. In 
the present case, by contrast, SecuraComm Pennsylvania 
did not establish that Securacom New Jersey knew that it 
was copying SecuraComm's name. Similarly, there was no 
evidence that Securacom New Jersey's attorneys had 
advised Securacom to conduct a full trademark search. In 
the absence of these key details, it is unreasonable to 
conclude that Securacom New Jersey's failure to conduct a 
trademark search established willful ignorance akin to 
willful infringement. Rather, as far as the record reflects, 
Securacom New Jersey's failure to conduct a search was at 
most careless. See Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indus., 
Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 480 (3d Cir. 1994); Interpace Corp. v. 
Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 463 (3d Cir. 1993). And 
carelessness is not the same as deliberate indifference with 
respect to another's rights in a mark or a calculated 
attempt to benefit from another's goodwill. See W.E. 
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Bassett, 435 F.2d at 662. Therefore, Securacom New 
Jersey's failure to conduct a trademark search is sufficient 
to establish that its infringement was willful or intentional. 
 
Third, Securacom New Jersey's failure to stop its use of 
the Securacomm mark after receiving Libengood's cease 
and desist letter does not demonstrate willful infringement. 
A defendant's refusal to cease using a mark upon demand 
is not necessarily indicative of bad faith. Sands, Taylor & 
Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 962 (7th Cir. 
1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1042 (1993). This is 
particularly true when the trademark at issue is not 
registered. Charles Jacquin Et Cie, Inc. v. Destileria 
Serralles, Inc., 921 F.2d 467, 472 (3d Cir. 1990). When 
Libengood sent the cease and desist letter, he did not have 
a federally registered mark. Libengood instructed 
Securacom New Jersey to cease using the Securacomm 
mark in early 1993, only ten days after he firstfiled to 
register his mark. The registration was not complete until 
May 20, 1997. In addition, since Securacom New Jersey 
had already been denied a trademark registration for the 
word "Securacom" because two other companies had 
attempted to register similar words, Securacom New Jersey 
had a reasonable ground for believing that SecuraComm 
Pennsylvania would also be unable to obtain federal 
registration in the name "Securacomm." 
 
In addition to the absence of a federally registered 
trademark, Securacom New Jersey had other reasons to 
believe that it had a legal right to use Securacom. First, 
Securacom New Jersey had a reasonable basis for 
concluding that Libengood did not have nationwide 
trademark rights in the mark due to the localized nature of 
his business. Additionally, Securacom New Jersey had a 
plausible basis for believing that its use of its name was not 
likely to cause confusion. As a result, Securacom New 
Jersey's failure to stop using the Securacomm mark after 
receiving Libengood's cease and desist letter does not 
support a finding of willful infringement. 
 
Finally, we agree with SecuraComm Pennsylvania that 
neither Walker's views regarding the civil justice system nor 
Securacom New Jersey's litigation tactics support the 
finding that Securacom New Jersey willfully infringed upon 
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Libengood's Securacomm mark. See SecuraComm 
Pennsylvania's Br. at 21 n. 6. There are other, appropriate 
remedies for abusive litigation tactics. Viewing all of the 
evidence together, we conclude that the record is 
insufficient to show that Securacom New Jersey willfully 
infringed upon SecuraComm Pennsylvania's mark and that 
the District Court's contrary finding was clearly erroneous. 
 
B. Defendant's Profits3 
 
Securacom New Jersey argues that the District Court 
abused its discretion when it awarded a portion of 
Securacom New Jersey's profits to SecuraComm 
Pennsylvania and then trebled this award.4  The District 
Court concluded that an award of 10% of Securacom New 
Jersey's profits for the years in question was appropriate to 
deter a willful infringer such as Securacom New Jersey 
from such acts in the future. 984 F. Supp. at 303. The 
District Court then trebled the damages because of the 
"egregious circumstances of this case." Id. 
 
Since the evidence does not support a finding that 
Securacom New Jersey willfully infringed Libengood's 
trademark rights, we conclude that the award of profits was 
not appropriate in the present case. The Lanham Act 
permits courts to award monetary damages to trademark 
owners as compensation where it is equitable to do so 
regardless of the willfulness of the defendant's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. When we refer to the District Court's award of profits in this case, we 
refer to its award of the defendant corporation's profits, in distinction 
to 
an award of plaintiff's lost profits. The District Court awarded 
defendant's profits not plaintiff's profits. See 5 J. Thomas McCarthy, 
McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition S 30.57 at 30-95 (noting 
"semantic confusion" in opinions discussing monetary recovery under 
S 1117: "the word profits is often used without revealing whose profits -- 
plaintiff's or infringer's -- are being discussed"). 
 
4. The District Court, at one time, described this award as a "royalty" 
without engaging in the analysis required to grant such an award. See 
A&H Sportswear Co. v. Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 1457, 
1479 (E.D. Pa. 1997). Both parties agree that the District Court's use of 
the word "royalty" was likely a shorthand description of Securacom New 
Jersey's profits. See Securacom New Jersey's Br. at 37; SecuraComm 
Pennsylvania's Br. at 30 n.10. 
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infringement. See 5 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on 
Trademarks and Unfair Competition S 30.75 at 30-128 (4th 
Ed. 1996) ("Unlike recovery of defendant's profits, attorney 
fees and treble damages, no wrongful intent or state of 
mind is needed for the recovery of actual damages [under 
15 U.S.C. S 1117(a).]"). In this case, however, the District 
Court awarded profits to deter defendant's assertedly 
egregious misconduct; a plaintiff must prove that an 
infringer acted willfully before the infringer's profits are 
recoverable. George Basch Co. v. Blue Corral, Inc., 968 F.2d 
1532, 1537 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 991 (1992); see 
also, 5 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and 
Unfair Competition S 30:62, at 30-102 (4th ed. 1996). 
 
Once monetary damages have been awarded, the Lanham 
Act permits courts, under certain circumstances, to 
enhance the damages. 15 U.S.C. S 1117(a) (1994); see also 
5 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and 
Unfair Competition, S 30:90 at 30-146 (4th Ed. 1996) Since 
the evidence at trial did not support a finding of willful 
infringement, the award of profits was not warranted, and 
trebling the damages was likewise inappropriate. See 
Caesar's World, Inc. v. Venus Lounge, Inc., 520 F.2d 269, 
273 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that enhanced damages award 
was inappropriate where no evidence of actual damages 
was adduced; "[t]hree times zero is zero."). We therefore 
reverse the award of profits and treble profits.5 
 
C. Attorneys' Fees 
 
Securacom New Jersey contends that the District Court 
improperly exercised its discretion in awarding attorneys' 
fees.6 The Lanham Act provides that a court may award 
reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party when 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Securacom New Jersey argues that the District Court erred in 
awarding profits based on its national profits because Libengood did not 
have national trademark rights prior to the federal registration of his 
mark on May 20, 1997. Because we conclude that profits were not 
properly awarded in the present case, we need not reach this issue. 
 
6. The Lanham Act gives the District Court the discretionary power to 
award attorneys' fees. 15 U.S.C. S 1117(a) (1994). We review the district 
court's award of attorneys' fees for abuse of discretion. Ferrero U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Ozak Trading, Inc., 952 F.2d 44, 48 (3d Cir. 1991). 
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"exceptional circumstances" exist. 15 U.S.C.S 1117(a). Our 
Court has interpreted "exceptional circumstances" to 
include culpable conduct on the part of the losing party, 
such as bad faith, fraud, malice or knowing infringement. 
Ferrero U.S.A., Inc. v. Ozak Trading, Inc., 952 F.2d 44, 47 
(3d Cir. 1991). In this case, the District Court awarded 
attorneys' fees to SecuraComm Pennsylvania because 
Securacom New Jersey exhibited bad faith, fraud, malice, 
and knowing infringement. 984 F. Supp. at 303-04. Since 
the District Court's finding of willful infringement appears 
to be a substantial basis for the award of attorneys' fees, we 
are required to reverse and remand on the issue of whether 
exceptional circumstances, other than willful infringement, 
exist warranting an attorneys' fees award. 
 
III. 
 
Because the evidence in the record does not support the 
finding of willful infringement, we reverse the award of 
profits and attorneys' fees. We remand the issue of 
attorneys' fees for further consideration. 
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